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Abstract —Actually, only one Second Order Differential Power 
Analysis (SO-DPA) countermeasure has been published. This 
solution is multiple masking solutions. It consume a lot of area 
and need to design two independent True Random Number 
Generator (TRNG). This work proposes a new SO-DPQ 
countermeasure for AES cipher. It combines a simple masking 
solution with the CPNG countermeasure. Our solution optimizes 
area overhead and reduces the total number of TRNG. The 
robustness of the novel method is demonstrated with 
experimental method using FPGA implementation. 
Keywords: DPA, AES, FPGA, countermeasures, hardware security. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Side channel attacks exploit information that leaks from 
physical implementations of cryptographic algorithms. The 
analysis of this leakage reveals information on the secret data 
manipulated by the implementation. Among the side channel 
attacks, the Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [1] is one of the 
most powerful against unprotected cryptographic 
implementations: it allows extracting the value of a secret key 
with only a few leakage measurements. A DPA is a statistical 
attack that correlates a physical leakage with the values of 
intermediate variables that depend on both the plaintext and the 
secret key. To avoid information leakage, the manipulation of 
sensitive variables must be protected by adding 
countermeasures [2-3].  
Protected design is secured from the first DPA attack. But 
they are not secured from  Higher Order DPA (HO-DPA) 
attack.  In our work, we are interested only on the Second 
Order DPA (SO-DPA) attack. It needs a combing function in 
order to join the mutual information in two points in the traces 
of power consumption. The number of countermeasure in the 
first order is rising up to date. Unfortunately, there is a single 
countermeasure for the SO-DPA attack which uses multiple 
random masking [4]. It basic idea is to combine two simple 
masking countermeasures. Its robustness is relied to the 
dependency between the two TRNGs used in this 
countermeasure. To optimize the performance of SO-DPA 
countermeasure, we introduce a new countermeasure. In order 
to avoid the use of the two TRNGs, we combine two first order 
DPA countermeasures: the simple masking countermeasure 
with the Correlated Power Noise generator CPNG [5]. We 
verify the performance of this solution and its robustness. 
This paper is organized in seven parts. The first one is the 
current introduction. The second one describes the SO-DPA 
attack principle. It indicate the combined function used in this 
attack. In the third one, we list the existing countermeasures for 
this type of attack. In the four one, we present our new SO- 
DPA countermeasure. In the five one, we give an experimental 
validation of our solution. In the six one, we compare the 
performance between our solution and the multiple masking. 
Finally, we conclude in the seven one.  
II. SO-DPA ATTACK PRINCIPLE 
A. Attack description  
The aim of the SO-DPA attack is to retrieve the secret key 
K from the leakage signals L(t) during the execution of known 
plaintext Din unless the existence of the First Order DPA (FO-
DPA) countermeasure. The leakage signals in this attack are 
traces of power consumption. We need then in SO-DPA attack 
to collect power consumption traces from cryptographic 
design. Usually, the SO-DPA attack is applied in cryptographic 
implementation secured from the FO-DPA attack only. In this 
case, the masked solution is the most used [4]. To surpass the 
first order countermeasure, the solution is to combine two 
leakage signals L(t1) and L(t2) at two distinct instants t1 and t2. 
The combining functions used in the SO-DPA attack are 
generally the product one and the absolute difference.  The 
second step of SO-DPA attack is to apply a differential analysis 
method in order to extract the secret key K. This method can be 
the mean distance [1], the maximum likelihood [6] test and the 
correlation analysis [7]. Generally, it is the last processing data 
is the most used in the SO-DPA attack. For this raison, we 
choose this method.  
B. Combining function of SO-DPA attack 
The choice of the combining function is very critical part in 
SO-DPA attack. It describes the method to join the information 
in the power consumption traces. In the literature, there are two 
main combining functions: the absolute difference value [8] 
function and the improved product function [9]. In our work 
[10], we have shown that the improved product function is 
more efficient that the absolute value and it is adapted to  
second order DPA attack for hardware implementation. 
III. SO-DPA ATTACK COUNTERMEASURES 
For the second order DPA attack, the only efficient 
countermeasure is the multiple masking introduced by 
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Schramm [4]. Its basic idea is to use two independents masks 
M1 and M2 for the same plaintext Din. The figure 1 explains the 
principle idea of this countermeasure.  
 
Figure 1.  Principales of mutiple masking countermeausre 
But this countermeasure can be viewed as the same mask 
M=𝑀1 ⊕𝑀2. This intermediate value doesn’t generate any 
leakage signal. 
Piret et al[11] study the multiple masking  countermeasure. 
This studies permits to improve the robustness of masking 
countermeasure. The figure 2 presents the adaptation of this 
countermeasure in hardware solution. ModifiedSubBytes1and 
ModifiedSubBytes2 is given by the equation (1) 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐵𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠1 𝐷𝑖𝑛 ,𝐾,𝑀1,𝑀2 = 𝑆𝐵𝑜𝑥 𝐷𝑖𝑛 ⊕𝐾 ⊕𝑀1 ⊕𝑀2 ⊕𝑀1 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐵𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠2 𝐷𝑖𝑛 ,𝐾,𝑀1,𝑀2 = 𝑆𝐵𝑜𝑥 𝐷𝑖𝑛 ⊕𝐾 ⊕𝑀1 ⊕𝑀2 ⊕
𝑀1 ⊕𝑀2                                                                                                        (1) 
 
Figure 2.  Hardware implmentation of multiple masking countermeasure  
The robustness of the multiple masking depends in the 
independence between the two TRNGs used in this 
countermeasure. We will introduce a new countermeasure with 
a one TRNG in the next part. 
IV. PRINCIPLE OF MCPNG COUNTERMEASURE 
To improve the robustness of the multiple masking 
countermeasure for SO-DPA attack, we have the idea to 
replace one of the simple masking solution by the Correlated 
Power Noise Generator (CPNG) one which have been already 
published [5]. In fact, the principle of the proposed 
architectural countermeasure against SO-DPA attack is to 
combine two first-order-DPA countermeasures: the simple 
masking countermeasure [12] and the CPNG one. The figure 3 
describes the basic idea of this new second order Masked 
Correlated Power Noise Generator (MCPNG) countermeasure. 
The plaintext Din is the input of the function AddMask. It 
applies a xor operation between Din and the random mask M.  
The input of the first iteration of masked AES mDin is inserted 
also in the masked correlated noise power generator.  This 
generator is composed of two modules AddRoundKey and the 
MaskedSubytes. This last module is generated with the smallest 
masked S-Box [13].  In the masked correlated noise generator, 
we use the interference key Kinterf in order to generate the power 
noise correlated with the bloc with the useful key K.  
The signals S and Sinterf are protected from the first DPA 
with the simple masking countermeasure. In order to prevent 
from SO- DPA attack and make the mutual information 
unused, we interfere the power of the signal S with the power 
noise Sinterf. We will show experimentally the robustness of the 
MCPNG countermeasure for second order DPA attacks. 
 
Figure 3.  Description of the new second order countermeasure. 
V. EXPRIMENTAL VALIDATION AND RESULT 
A. DPA experimentation 
The second order DPA attack is composed by three parts: 
 Collecting the consumed power traces related to 
secured cryptographic design, 
 Combining the power traces with the combining 
function C, 
 Predicting the correct key by using the analysis 
correlation on the combined traces with power model 
defined by the prediction function. 
We realize the second order DPA attack on the secured 
design from the first order DPA attack only. The experimental 
setup [10] is composed by a digital oscilloscope, computer and 
FPGA board. The communication between the computer and 
the scope is realized by General Purpose Interface Bus GPIB 
IEEE-488. The digital oscilloscope has 100 MHz bandwidth  
and 200 MS/s maximum rate sampling. The FPGA board is the 
Actel flash fusion AFS-600. The measure of the power 
consumption is done by inserting a 0.2  resistor between the 
power supply and the FPGA board. A signal trigger is 
generated by the board to synchronize acquisition of power 
consumption and time execution of the design under attack. We 
collect the power consumption traces of design implemented 
with flash FPGA. We employ the improved product combining 
function. To retrieve the secret key K, we choose the 
correlation analysis. 
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B. SO-DPA attack on the simple masking and  CPNG 
countermeasures  
In this part, we realize two SO-DPA attacks. The first 
attack is for design protected by the CPNG countermeasure 
only. The second one is for AES implementation secured with 
simple masking solution. In first attack, we consider the AES 
implementation secured with CPNG countermeasure. The 
figure 4 gives the different part of this implementation. We 
realize a SO-DPA attack on this design. We can retrieve the 
secret key as illustrated by the figure 5. In the second attack, 
we implement the AES design secured with the simple 
masking solution. The figure 6 describes design under attack. 
We realize SO-DPA attack on this design. The figure 7 shows 
that we can extract key. 
 
Figure 4.  Implemnation of the beginning of the first AES iteration secured 
with CPNG countermeasure   
 
Figure 5.  Illustration of secsseful SO-DPA attack secured by the CPNG with 
a number of traces 20480, the correct key K=43 
 
Figure 6.  Implemnation of the beginning of the first AES iteration secured 
with masking countermeasure   
C. SO-DPA attack on design secured with MCPNG 
countermeasure   
In this experience, we use the proposed countermeasure 
MCPNG. In order to generate correlated masked power noise, 
the same masked input is applied into two blocs composing 
from AddRoundKey and MaskedSubBytes. The figure 8 
illustrates this design. The bloc that employs the interfering key 
is considered to be a correlated masked power noise for the 
other bloc which employs the secret key K. 
 
Figure 7.  Succesufull second order DPA attack on masking countermeasure 
with K= 43 and 20480 traces  
 
Figure 8.  Implemnation of the beginning of the first AES iteration secured 
with MCPNG countermeasure   
The power consumption model chosen for correlation analysis 
is given by the equation (2) Where H is the Hamming weight.  
𝑃𝑀 = 𝑯  𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑆𝑢𝑏𝐵𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝐷𝑖𝑛 ⊕𝐾   ⨁ 𝐷𝑖𝑛 ⊕𝐾                (2) 
 
The second order DPA attack on the design secured with 
MCPNG can’t extract the secret key K.  The number of traces 
is 20480. It is the same number that is necessary to achieve the 
attack as mentioned [10]. The figure 9 illustrate the failure of 
this attack with the correct key is equal to K=43 and the 
multiplication point PM=153. The table I gives some correlation 
values for different points of multiplication.  We have done the 
multiplication for possible values of power consumption. The 
attack time is about 72 hours calculated with a computer which 
horologe frequency is 2.8 GHz. 
Table I. Simulation results for second order DPA attack on design secured 
with MCPNG countermeasure 
PM 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 152 
k 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 0,03 
k 249 249 39 138 138 138 138 138 120 246 
K 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCES OF MCPNG 
COUNTERMEASURE  
The implementation of the countermeasure MCPNG needs 
to design two modules AddRoundKey and MaskedSubytes. In 
order to compare the performances of countermeasure to 
multiple masking, we implement these two modules by three 
configurations: 
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 Unsecured AES S-Box using the smallest solution 
designed by Canright [13], 
 Secured AES S-Box with the multiple masking with the 
smallest  masked S-Box [14] , 
 Secured AES S-Box with the countermeasure MCPNG. 
 
Figure 9.  Illustration of unsecsseful SO-DPA attack on secured design by 
MCPNG countermeausre ,with a number of traces 20480, the correct key 
K=43 
The table II gives the implementation results with a Xilinx 
Virtex4 SRAM FPGA. It shows that the proposed 
countermeasure MCPNG use a number of materiel resources 
lightly small than the multiple masking.  The improvement of 
our solution is 11 slices of Virtex 4 to implement 
AddRoundKey and MaskedSubytes.  We notice the cost of 
security from the second order DPA attacks is very high 
compared with a circuit unsecured from all order DPA attack 
or secured from the first DPA attack. 
 
In our comparison, we have not considered the surface of 
the true random generator for masks generation. Our solution 
needs only one random mask whereas the multiple masking 
solution uses two different masks. As a consequence, our 
solution consumes less TRNG than the multiple masking 
solution. Moreover security is not only base on TRNG but also 
on the correlated power noise. We think that it is suitable 
against fault injection method, nevertheless this last point have 
never been studied. Our solution MCPNG has the same 
horologe frequency than multiple masking. Actually, the 
AddMask makes the critical path longer in both cases. 
Moreover, the MaskedSubBytes used in the two solutions has a 
critical path longer than the usual module SubBytes. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, a new countermeasure called MCPNG for 
second order DPA attacks against AES is introduced. This 
solution improves lightly the performances of second order 
DPA countermeasure.  Its basic idea is to combine two first 
order countermeasures to have a second order DPA 
countermeasure. Those countermeasures are the CPNG 
countermeasure [5] and the simple masking solution. This new 
countermeasure uses the masked correlated power noise 
generator to prevent the exploitation of mutual information in 
power consumption traces. The MCPNG countermeasure 
robustness is proved by experimental attack. 
Table II Performance comparaionbetween AES S-Box implementation on 
Viretex SRAM FPGA with differents configuration 
Performance 
SBox AES  
Unsecu
red [13]  
Secure with 
masking [14] 
Secure with 
proposed 
method 
Area (slices) 36 239 228 
Area overhead 0% + 563% + 533% 
Frequency (MHz) 184 144.6 144.6 
Frequency decreasing   0% -39.4% -39.4% 
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